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In yet another stunning, outrageous,  and "unpublished decision", Judge Donald L. Graham and the Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeals rule that an injunction is not an injunction so long as a federal magistrate judge deems the injunction to be a "discovery order" or new device called a "not injunction per se".   Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit and Judge Graham will not discuss the "discovery order" even if it violates the First Amendment, Tenth Amemdment, Florida Constitution, Florida Statutes. 


Judge Donald Graham, U.S. District Court, Southern District
Judge Donald L. Graham                                                         Maria Sorolis, esq. extraordinare  Maria Sorolis


 Ms.  Sorolis has  written some  really garbage legal briefs,  her firm  billed  Highlands  County more than $800,000 against an unrepresented  Plaintiff.   Some of  Ms. Sorolis  legal "briefs" are featured here.  However, credit must be given to Ms. Sorolis because she is smart enough to know that a pro se brief will not be read by any appellate court judge and that the law clerk will decide the case and affirm the district judge, law and facts notwithstanding.  Consequently, Ms. Sorolis will make any specious argument to the district judge because she knows that the Eleventh Circuit will affirm the district judge, assuming a pro se appellant can even perfect an appeal in the first instance.   I have managed to defeat  Ms. Sorolis and the county attorney  in  the  Florida  Appellate  Courts, however ,  I  have had no luck  defeating Ms.  Sorolis  before Judge  Graham and the  Eleventh  Circuit.   See Florida, Second District Court of Appeal Case Nos. 2D00-4002, 2D00-1071, and 2D00-1041.  I also defeated Ms. Sorolis in a unemployment compensation hearing where her clients (Highlands County Board County Commissioners) spent $50,000 to defeat a $3500 claim and still lost. See Florida Appeals Referee Decision.    This was no ordinary defeat for Ms. Sorolis as it was a crushing defeat because the Appeals Referee ruled:  "[B]ased upon the candor and demeanor of the parties and witnesses, it is held that the claimant's testimony is more credible where conflicts occur."


 

PERTINENT BACKGROUND MATERIAL

Case No. 99-14027
I originally filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of Florida bearing Case No.99-14027-CIV-Graham.  This case was ultimately assigned to Judge Donald L. Graham.  This case has had multiple appeals and petitions for mandamus associated with it. e.g.. Eleventh Circuit Case Nos. , 01-11305, 01-15754-A,  01-13664, 01-11850 ;  This case has more than 900 docket entries on the Pacer System.  See Pacer Docket Sheet.  The Defendant in this case and all other related cases,  the Highlands County Board County Commissioners, is a GOVERNMENT actor.  Highlands County is located in Sebring, Florida which is South Central Florida.  Judge Graham's office is in Miami, Florida, or approximately 160 miles from where I reside in Sebring, Florida.  Maria Sorolis and Brian Koji of Allen, Norton & Blue reside and work in Tampa, Florida, or some 90 miles away from Sebring, Florida.  Court papers are filed in Fort Pierce, Florida, or some 75 miles away from Sebring, Florida.  This lawsuit alleges discrimination, among other things, under  Title VII, the ADA, and violations of  §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 against the
Highlands County Board County Commissioners and other government
defendants and/or their agents.  On June 19, 2000 and July 25, 2000, the
Magistrate Judge, Lynch, issued the following directives:

               Plaintiff shall be prohibited from contacting any of the Defendants,
               including their supervisory employees and/or the individual
               Defendants, regarding any matter related to this case.  (DE #201),
               page 2 of 2 pages.

               Plaintiff shall correspond only with Defendants' counsel including
               any requests for public records. (DE #246), page 2 of 2 pages.
               Plaintiff shall be prohibited from contacting any of the Defendants,
               including their supervisory employees and/or the individual
               Defendants, regarding any matter related to this case.   (DE #246),  page 2 of 2 pages.

There are several things wrong with the foregoing directives, not the least of  which a Magistrate Judge can not issue an injunction or a restraining order.
   See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).    The Magistrate deals with this legal problem  by referring to his injunctions as "a pretrial discovery issue and not an
injunction per se."  In other words, the Magistrate is saying that he can issue  an injunction as long as he does not call it an injunction.  In other words the  Magistrate can make a mockery of the Congress and 28 U.S.C. §  636(b)(1)(A).  Notwithstanding the fact that a Magistrate can not issue an  injunction, the orders, (DE #201), page 2(DE #246), page 2  are also  illegal because I have a First Amendment Right to petition the government and  speak to the government anytime I feel like it.  I don't ever need a private for  profit law firm's permission to speak to the government or request Public  Records under, Florida Law.  The pertinent comments to Rule 4-4.2, R. Regulating Fla. Bar specifically states the following:
 
 

        Also, parties to a matter may communicate directly with each other and a lawyer  having independent justification for communicating with the other party to a controversy with a government agency with a government officials abut the  matter. Communications authorized by law include, for example, the right of a party to a controversy with a government agency to speak with government officials about the matter.

See also Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, Section 99

 

"[T]there is nothing that prohibits one party to a litigation from making direct contact with another party to the
same litigation. See e.g., Missouri Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.2 cmt. (". . . parties to a matter
may communicate directly with each other.). These rules are designed to regulate the conduct of lawyers, and simply do not
apply to the conduct of nonlawyers." E.E.O.C. v. McDONNELL DOUGLAS CORP., 948 F. Supp. 54(E.D.Mo. 1996) 


I repeatedly and incessantly challenged the jurisdiction of the court with  respect to these illegal orders, (DE #201), page 2(DE #246), page 2  ,  however, Judge Graham absolutely refused to state where he got the legal authority to issue the orders in question.  See for example, and note that this list is not collectively exhausted, Case No. 99-14027 see Plaintiff’s  motions and responses, (Doc. #200);(Doc. #239); (Doc. #262);(Doc.  #264);(Doc. #284);(Doc. #334);(Doc. #509);(Doc. #515);(Doc. #526);(Doc. 554);(Doc. 632, pg. 5);(Doc.#633);(Doc. 652);(Doc. 663); (Doc. 735); (Doc. 736); (Doc. 738); (Doc. 783); (Doc. 787, pgs 2-3); (Doc. 810); (Doc. 812); (Doc. 813); (Doc. 817); (Doc. 829), (Doc. 845);and the court's orders: (DE #201), page 2,(DE #246), page 2,;(Doc. #279);(Doc. 281);(Doc. #407, pg. 2  );(Doc.  #524);(Doc. #528);(Doc. #634);(Doc. 673);(Doc. 744);(Doc. 745);(Doc.  766);(Doc. 791);(Dgoto.php?w=oc. 874, pg. 2);(Doc. 882, pgs. 1-2), (DE-890), (DE-928), and relevant Defendants’ responses and motions, (Doc. 199); (Doc. 199);(Doc.  231);(Doc. 274);(Doc. 275); (Doc. 348);(Doc. 511);(Doc. 559);(Doc.  639);(Doc. 646);(Doc.690); (Doc. 823);(Doc. 834); (Doc. 838);(Doc. 841); (Doc. 859).



Judge Graham and his Magistrate, Frank Jr., (Frank Lynch Jr), decided they had the authority to prohibit me from speaking to my government out of our court unless I had the persmission of Allen, Norton, & Blue, a private lawfirm.  Judge Graham and his Magistrate, Frank Jr., (Frank Lynch Jr) have never stated where they got this authority from.   On June 20, 2001, Judge Graham decided to dismiss my lawsuit because he alleged that I communicated with my government,Highlands County Board County Commissioners, without the persmission of private for profit attorneys.  See  (DE #766) , (DE 791).  During the process of the litigation and after the case was closed, I repeatedly asked Judge Graham where he got such legal authority, Judge Graham declined to answer any such inquiry.  

I filed  several appeals and writs in this case seeking to get these illegal orders  reversed, but the Eleventh Circuit has decided to evade the issue and these  illegal orders each time.   See Case No. 01-11305, order denying relief, page 2  
See  01-11305 Mandamus Petition.; Case No. 01-15754-A, order denying relief; Case No. 00-16064-F, order denying relief; Case Nos. 01-11850Case No . 04-11894 Opinion of May 20, 2004.  There is absolutely no discussion of these illegal (DE #201 pdf )(DE #246 pdf ) orders anywhere. 


DEFINITION OF AN INJUNCTION AND DEPENDENT WORDS OR PHRASES

Given that I am not an attorney,  only a mere college graduate and presumably too stupid to understand what an injuntion is, I decided to look the term up in a dictionary.  

Injunction:

1.     The act or an instance of enjoining; a command, a directive, or an order.

2.       Law. A court order prohibiting a party from a specific course of action.[1]

Enjoin:

1.    To direct or impose with authority and emphasis. See synonyms at command.

2.                   To prohibit or forbid. See synonyms at forbid.[2]

Webster’s New World, Collegiate Dictionary, 4th Edition, @ 1999 definitions:

enjoin  to join into, put upon; 1. to urge or impose with authority; order; enforce; 2 to prohibit, esp. by legal injunction; forbid [the company was enjoined from using false advertising] 3 to order (someone) authoritatively to do something, esp. by legal injunction.

injunction n.[[LL injunctio < pp. of L injungere, to ENJOIN] 1 an enjoining; bidding; command 2 something enjoined; 3 a writ or order from a court prohibiting a person or group from carrying out a given action, or ordering a given action to be done

Black's Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, @1968

 

Enjoin

To require a person, by writ of injunction from a court of equity, to perform, or to abstain or desist from, some act.


[1]The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Third Edition copyright © 1992 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Electronic version licensed from INSO Corporation; further reproduction and distribution restricted in accordance with the Copyright Law of the United States. All rights reserved.

[2]Id.


Statements by Maria a Sorolis and Allen, Norton & Blue

(3) On June 19th, this Court granted Defendants’ Motion and ordered that the Plaintiff was prohibited from contacting any of the Defendants, including their
supervisory employees and/or the individual Defendants, regarding any matter relating to this case. The Court further ordered that Plaintiff correspond only with Defendants’ counsel.
(4) Subsequent to the Court’s June 19thOrder, Plaintiff continued to contact the Defendants whom he was directed not to contact. His communications were intimidating and were made in an attempt to undermine several witnesses’ ability to testify truthfully. In defense of his actions, Plaintiff claimed that he believed that the scope of the Court’s June 19thOrder was limited to communications with Defendants regarding issues regarding the instant case.
(5) On July 6, 2000, Defendants filed a renewed Motion for Preliminary Injunction based upon Plaintiffs willful violations of the Court’s June 19th Order. In their motion, Defendants requested that the Court enter an Order prohibiting Plaintiff from directly contacting them for any matter.
(6) On July 25, 2000, the Court granted Defendants’ Renewed Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and ordered Plaintiff to refrain from contacting any of the Defendants, including their supervisory employees and/or the individual Defendants, regarding any matter related to this case. This Order provided that Plaintiff shall correspond only with Defendants’ counsel, including any request for public records. In its Order, the Court explicitly held that any future violations of the Order would result in this Court imposing sanctions against the Plaintiff, including a recommendation of dismissal with prejudice as to all claims.

See DEFENDANTS’ SECOND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS IN THE FORM OF DISMISSAL.  

(4) On July 6, 2000, Defendants filed a renewed Motion for Preliminary Injunction based upon Plaintiffs blatant violations of this Court’s June 19, 2000 Order. In their motion, Defendants requested that this Court enter an Order prohibiting Plaintiff from directly contacting them for any matter. Id.  
(5) On July 25, 2000, this Court granted Defendants’ Renewed Motion for Preliminary Injunction and ordered Plaintiff to refrain from contacting any of the
Defendants including their supervisory employees and/or the individual Defendants regarding any matter related to this case. This Order provided that
Plaintiff shall correspond only with Defendants’ counsel, including any request  for public records. The Order also prohibited Plaintiff from contacting any of the named Defendants in this case, including their supervisory employees and/or the
individual Defendants, who are parties in other actions (Fellin, St. Germain, etc.) and are represented by counsel in those actions regarding any matter related to those cases. In this Order the Court explicitly held that any future violations of the Order would result in this Court imposing sanctions against the Plaintiff, including a recommendation of dismissal with prejudice as to all claims. (Exhibit 4).

(6) During the week of February 5, 2001, Plaintiff knowingly violated this Court’s Orders of June 19, 2000 and July 25, 2000. Plaintiff appeared at the office of Fred Carino, Human Resource Director of Highlands County and a supervisory employee of a named defendant in this action, and demanded to view his personnel file. This request was made directly to Mr. Carino’s office and not through Defendant Highlands County’s counsel.1 Notwithstanding, his file was produced to him. During this visit, Plaintiff pointed out that certain portions of the contents of his personnel file should be removed. (Exhibit 5). These acts were done with apparent intent to challenge this Court’s authority to issue Orders enjoining Plaintiffs conduct.
(7) On February 13, 2001, Plaintiff appeared at Fred Carino’s office and demanded to view attorney billing records from Defendant Highlands County’s counsel relevant to its defense of his litigation. Mr. Mason left before the records could be produced.

See DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SANCTIONS IN THE FORM OF  DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF’S ACTION SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF LAW

Statements by Judge Graham and his Magistrate
See if you can make sense of Graham's Magistrate's gobbledygook. 

The Plaintiff alludes to this Court's rulings, issued June 19 and July 25, 2000 , directing that he should not contact any of the Defendants or individual Defendants, including their supervisory employees, regarding any matter related to this case except through their counsel of record. If the Plaintiff was represented, his attorney would know that this is proper procedure. The Plaintiff questions this Court's authority to enter an "injunction" as he calls it preventing him from contacting the parties directly . This Court has entered numerous orders on this issue in ruling on Plaintiff's many requests for clarification/to vacate, etc ., of this issue and has attempted to clearly point out to the Plaintiff that it is a discovery issue and not one appropriate for injunctive relief. The Plaintiff has appealed those orders to the District Court and they have been affirmed by Judge Graham. Also, this Court points out to the District Court that on innumerable occasions the Plaintiff has seen fit to simply disregard this Court's previous orders and/or continually ask for 'clarification" or "renew" requests for relief that have already been ruled upon on several occasions.

See (Doc  766, Report and Recommendtion, pg.3, ¶5); (Doc. 791, Order Adopting Report and Recommendtion).


Eleventh Circuit's Statements- JUNK LAW

There is no discussion by the Eleventh Circuit as to whether the orders in question are injunctions or not according to any legal definition.  There is no discussion as to why these orders do or do not violate the First Amendment, Tenth Amendment, Florida Constitution, and the Florida Statutes. 

“Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227(1821).  Although the “outright dismissal of a lawsuit is a particularly severe sanction” for conduct by a litigant that abuses the judicial process, it is within a federal court's inherent power. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,501 U.S. 32, 45, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 2133 (1991)(holding that district court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed sanctions under its inherent power, even though the conduct was sanctionable under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).

Moreover, the magistrate judge and district court attempted to clarify with Mason that the Orders were not injunctions, but rather necessary for the orderly litigation of the case. It is significant that the defendants continued to produce records upon Mason's request, despite his clear violation of the Orders, and reminded him to contact the defendants via their counsel.  It is also significant that Mason admitted sending e-mail to former defendant Carl Cool on 14 July 2000, after the magistrate had issued the 19 June 19 2000 order, and admitted that he had requested billing records directly from Highlands County.

In sum, the district court properly exercised its discretion under Rule 41(b) to impose respect and submission to its lawful orders. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45, 111 S. Ct. at 2133; Anderson,19 U.S. at 227.



See (Text Format) Case No. 01-13664 Eleventh Circuit's Unpublished and Unsigned "Opinion"  (pdf). 

LEGAL ANALYSIS

These orders are so violative of the law that they do not need discussion, however, I won't reduce my self to Judge Graham and the Eleventh Circuit's level and refuse to discuss legal authority.  I have to play by the rules !

 Prior restraint has traditionally been defined as a ‘predetermined judicial prohibition restraining specified expression . . . .’ The essence of prior restraint is that it places specific communications under the personal censorship of the judge.”  Bernard v. Gulf-Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459, 474 (5th Cir. 1980)[1] (en banc), aff'd, 452 U.S. 89, 101 S.Ct. 2193, 68 L.Ed.2d 693 (1981).  In fact, Bernard makes abundantly clear that communications authorized by law[2], such as a non-lawyer communicating with his government, are not subject to prior restraints.  “[T]he interest of the judiciary in the proper administration of justice does not authorize any blanket exception to the first amendment.”  Id. at 474. Given that the orders in question are unconstitutional, they are void.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not create federal jurisdiction.  In re Infant Formula Antitrust Litigation, MDL 878 v. Abbott Laboratories, 72 F. 3d 842, 843 (11th Cir. 1995)(citing Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 368-370 & n. 7, 98 S.Ct. 2396, 2400 & n. 7, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978)).


The Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly stated,  “[W]e do not equate the acquisition of public documents under chapter 119 with the rights of discovery afforded a litigant by judicially-created rules of procedure…, Henderson v. State, 745 So.2d 319 (Fla. 1999)”;  See also Wait v. Florida Power and Light Company, 372 So. 2d 420, 425 (Fla. 1979) (holding that the fact that a litigant simultaneously engages in litigation before a federal agency does not in any way prevent its use of chapter 119 to gain access to public documents.”).  “Within our federal system the substantive rights provided by the Federal Constitution define only a minimum.  If Florida’s highest court, interpreting Florida Law, says that a litigant has a right to public records even if he or she is suing the government, then who is a magistrate to say otherwise?  The U.S. Supreme Court says: “Within our federal system the substantive rights provided by the Federal Constitution define only a minimum.  State law may recognize liberty interests more extensive than those independently protected by the Federal Constitution.  If so, the broader state protections would define the actual substantive rights possessed by a person living within that State.”  Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300 (1982).  In Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Supreme Court opined:

Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State.  And whether the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern.

 




[1] Decisions by the former Fifth Circuit issued before October 1, 1981 are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. See  Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

[2] The pertinent comments to Rule 4-4.2, R. Regulating Fla. Bar specifically states the following:

Also, parties to a matter may communicate directly with each other and a lawyer  having independent justification for communicating with the other party to a controversy with a government agency with a government officials abut the  matter. Communications authorized by law include, for example, the right of a party to a controversy with a government agency to speak with government officials about the matter.

See also Restatement of the Law (Third) The Law Governing Lawyers, §99. Cmt. K., pg. 76.  The S.D.Fla. and the Eleventh Circuit have expressly adopted these rules. 

 

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