Judge Donald Graham, U.S. District Court, Southern District
                                                           Maria Sorolis

Maria Sorolis, Allen, Norton & Blue, served as the attorneys for the Defendant Highlands County and other Government defendants.  Ms. Sorolis has written some really outstanding garbage briefs that were bought hook, line, and sinker by a more than willing Judge Graham.  See 99-14027-CV-Graham Case Summary.

The law with regard to in forma pauperis (IFP) applications is really quite simple.  In forma pauperis applications can be denied for two reasons only, untrue allegations of poverty and frivolousness.  See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992).

Graham has denied me access to the courts by making a string of arbitrary denials of in forma pauperis (IFP) applications.  See Eleventh Circuit and Judge Graham make a mockery of the In Forma Pauperis Statutes .  Mr. Graham does not cite, less known substantiate either reason [untrue allegations of poverty and frivolousness].  In these denials there isn’t any pretense of law or facts to support these decisions.  Mr. Graham by his unwillingness to share any legal reasons for these denials of IFP motions has virtually stated: “I am denying your IFP motion because I want to, the law be damned”.  These arbitrary denials have included, but are not limited to the following instances:

LEGAL MEMORANDUM

Trustmark holds that under the circumstances present in the instant case that res judicata  is impossible.  Specifically, Trustmark held that “relevant in this analysis is when the facts arose.”  “The delayed discovery rule prevents a cause of action from accruing until the plaintiff either knows or reasonably should know of the act giving rise to the cause of action.”  Id.  (citing Hearndon v. Graham, 767 So. 2d 1179, 1184 (Fla. 2000)).  “The doctrine of res judicata does not however bar a cause merely because the actions arose from the same factual situation… Identity of the causes of action is established where the facts which are required to maintain both actions are identical.”  Cole v. First Dev. Corp. Of Am., 339 So.2d 1130, 1131 (Fla.App. 2 Dist.1976); Wu v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 1543, 1548-49 (11th Cir. 1989) (prior discrimination action did not bar current action for retaliation).  Applying this requirement to the instant case, the facts required to establish Plaintiff’s failure to hire claims that arose on March 28, 2001 and January 25, 2000, respectively, are different from those requirements those that related to Plaintiff’s termination on November 30, 1998. “A judgment is not res judicata  as to rights which were not in existence and which could not have been litigated at the time the prior judgment was entered.”  Wood v Martin, 688 So. 2d 431; 1997 Fla. App. LEXIS 1791, *8 (Fla. 5^th DCA 1997).   “When other facts or conditions intervene before the second suit, furnishing a new basis for the claims and defenses of the respective parties, the issues are no longer the same and the former judgment cannot be pleaded in bar of the second action.”  State Street Bank v. Badra, 765 So.2d 251, 254 (Fla.App. 4 Dist. 2000); Albrecht v. State, 444 So.2d 8 (Fla. 1984)(“ It is also a settled rule that when the second suit is between the same parties, but based upon a different cause of action from the first, the prior judgment will not serve as an estoppel except as to those issues actually litigated and determined in it.”) “[A]s a matter of logic, when the second action concerns a transaction occurring after the commencement of the prior litigation, claim preclusion generally does not come into play.”  Maharaj v. Bankamerica Corp., 128 F.3d 94,  (2nd Cir. 1997).  Significantly, and on the facts that are indistinguishable from the instant case, the State Street Court held that neither res judicata  or collateral estoppel were appropriate. 

While the two complaints filed by State Street Bank in the first 'and second actions were identical, the notices of acceleration, differed significantly between the two cases.  The first action  ‘relied upon notices of acceleration dated December 15, 1992 and March 22, 1993 and the instant action relied upon a notice of acceleration dated February 18, 1997, after the conclusion of the  first action.

Id. at 254.

For similar cases involving the identical factual premise, see Lawlor v. National Screen Service, 349 U.S. 322, 327-328 (1955); Manning v. City Of Auburn, 953 F.2d 1355 (11th Cir. 1992); Pleming v. Universal-Rundle Corporation, 142 F.3d 1354, 1357-58 (11th Cir. 1998); Southeast Florida Cable v. Martin County, 173 F.3d 1332, 1336-7(11th Cir. 1999); Florida Power & Light Co. v. U.S., 198 F.3d 1358, 1360-1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

            Legally, Plaintiff had no obligation to amend his lawsuit to add after acquired claims even if they accrued during the process of this litigation.  Pleming v. Universal-Rundle Corporation, 142 F.3d 1354, 1357(11th Cir. 1998)(“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d), which governs supplemental pleadings, makes such a pleading optional and held that the doctrine of res judicata does not punish a plaintiff for exercising the option not to supplement the pleadings with an after-acquired claim…[a] judgment is only conclusive regarding the matters that the parties might have litigated at that time but not regarding "new rights acquired, pending the action which might have been, but which were not required to be litigated.”).  However, the Defendants vigorously opposed motions for leave to amend and this Court agreed with the Defendants.