"I have the Inherent Authority to Overrule the
Constitution and the Congress of the United States !!
BLACK LETTER LAW OR BEDROCK LEGAL PRINCIPLE
It is a bedrock principle of the United States
that an order issued in violation of due process is void. . See
Anderson
v. Dunn,
19
U.S.
204, 217 (1821)(“the constitution, by prohibiting an act,
renders it void, if done; otherwise, the prohibition were
nugatory. Thus, the warrant is a nullity.”); Lops v. Lops,
140 F.3d 927, 941 n. 19(11th Cir. 1998) (“something that is null
has no legal or binding force.”). "'No
judgment of a court is due process of law, if rendered without
jurisdiction in the court, or without notice to the party.” Old
Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n v. McDonough,
204
U.S.
8, 15 (1907). "
"Inherent
Authority"
According to Judge Donald L.
Graham, his Magistrate, Frank Lynch Jr., and the Eleventh Circuit, U.S.
Court of Appeals, each of them have the inherent authority to simply
ignore the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, U.S. Statutes, the
United States Constitution, the Florida Constitution, and the Florida
Statutes whenever they see fit. Judge Graham abused inherent authority in
the following manner:
- Judge Graham allowed his Magistrate, Frank
Lynch Jr. to render two injunctions which precluded Marcellus
Mason from communicating directly with the Highlands County
government in Sebring, Florida. On June 20, 2001, Judge Graham dismissed a
lawsuit because Marcellus Mason communicated with the
Highlands County Government out of
court. See Overruling
the First Amendment at : http://mmason.orgfree.com/OverRuleFirstAmendment.htm
- Judge Graham issued a "pre-filing
injunction" sua sponte or on his own motion on September
20, 2001. Sua sponte "pre-filing injunctions"
are by definition issued without notice and opportunity to
respond. This "pre-filing injunction" precluded the
Plaintiff, Marcellus Mason from filing lawsuits against the
Highlands County Board of County Commissioners unless Judge
Graham approved of the lawsuit. This See Docket
Entry No. 878. "Sua sponte pre-filing
injunctions have been vacated and reversed by every
jurisdiction in the United States. For legal
authority see mmason.orgfree.com/RejectSuaSponte.htm
- Judge Graham abused inherent authority make a
finding of "bad faith" without notice and
opportunity to respond or due process. According
to the Supreme Court, a finding of bad faith requires due
process or notice and opportunity to respond. " A
court must, of
course, exercise caution in invoking
its inherent power, and it must comply with the mandates
of due process, both in
determining that the requisite bad faith exists and in
assessing fees.” (emphasis
added) Chambers
v. Nasco, Inc.,
501
U.S.
32, 50 (1991)"
- Judge Graham took this same invalid sua
sponte issued pre-filing injunction and awarded attorney's
fees of $200,000 the Plaintiff, Marcellus Mason, who was
proceeding in forma pauperis because he was too pay the filing
fee of $150.00. See mmason.orgfree.com/DE-882/de882.htm
- Judge Graham took this same sua sponte issued
pre-filing injunction to initiate a criminal contempt
complaint against Marcellus Mason. See mmason.orgfree.com/contempt.html
Background, See Introduction.
The Defendants being referenced on this
page and all other pages are Government Defendants and their employees,
specifically: Highlands County Board of County
Commissioners, Hardee County Board of County Commissioners
,Okeechobee County Board of County Commissioners, and Heartland Library
Cooperative.
The most blatant abuse of inherent authority by Judge
Graham was to concoct a "filing
injunction" on September 20, 2001 and
use this same illegal and void "filing
injunction" to gain
a criminal conviction against a person who has never been convicted of
any crime
. After Judge Graham got tired of having to answer relentless
inquiries [Judge Graham has never answered this inquiry] into where he
derived the legal authority to tell a party [Marcellus Mason] that he
could not communicate with his government directly, or request public
records directly from his government under Florida law; Judge
Graham issued the "filing injunction" on September
20, 2001. The order is void because it was issued "sua sponte"
and without the legally required notice and opportunity to respond, or
simple "due process". Moreover, Judge Graham deliberately misstated
material facts to justify this "filing
injunction". The
Eleventh Circuit has
consistently and persistently refused to allow Marcellus Mason the
opportunity to appeal this "filing
injunction". See
Undermining
An Appeal Right. Even
more outrageous than that the Eleventh Circuit struck an appeal brief
because they claim the "filing
injunction" was "beyond
the scope of appeal" and then turned around used the same "filing
injunction" that they
struck Marcellus Mason's brief for, to affirm Judge Graham. See Undermining
An Appeal Right. Judge
Graham then took this void order or "filing
injunction" and
got a criminal conviction
against Mason. The Eleventh Circuit has used all manner of ploys
in "unpublished opinions" to disallow Marcellus Mason a chance at
appellate review of this illegal and void "filing
injunction". See full
story.
INHERENT AUTHORITY TO STOP DIRECT
COMMUNICATION
Judge Graham: I can take away your
right to Communicate with your Government
On
June 19, 2000, (DE#201),
and July 25, 2000, (DE#246),
Judge Graham's Magistrate, Frank Lynch issued the following
injunctions, enjoining the Plaintiff, Marcellus Mason, Jr. from
communicating with his government directly. Judge Graham's
Magistrate, Frank Lynch, Jr., gave the following directive with Judge
Graham's explicit approval:
[D]efendants' Motion for Preliminary Injunction is Granted
in that the Plaintiff shall be prohibited
from contacting any of the Defendants, including their supervisory
employees and/or the individual Defendants, regarding any matter
related to this case . Plaintiff shall correspond only with Defendants'
counsel .
See (DE#201).
Moreover, Judge Graham and his Magistrate have the legal authority to
deny citizen its right to demand public records from the government
directly. Consider the following:
[P]laintiff shall correspond only with Defendants' counsel
including any requests for public records...
See (DE#246)
Judge Graham: I can Dismiss your
Lawsuit if you Communicate with your Government
The Plaintiff alludes to
this Court's rulings, issued June 19 and July 25, 2000, directing that
the should not contact any of the Defendants or individual Defendants,
including their supervisory employees, regarding any matter related to
this case except through their counsel of record. If the Plaintiff was
represented, his attorney would know that this is proper procedure. The
Plaintiff questions this Court's authority to enter an "injunction" as
he calls it preventing him from contacting the parties directly . This
Court has entered numerous orders on this issue in ruling on
Plaintiff's many requests for clarification/to vacate, etc. ., of this
issue and has attempted to clearly point out to the Plaintiff that it
is a discovery issue and not one appropriate for injunctive
relief. See
(DE#766 , pg 3, ¶5), (DE#791).
This Court's order of July 25, 2000
further provided that any violations will result in sanctions including
recommendation of dismissal with prejudice . In their Motions for
Sanctions, Defendants contend that the Plaintiff has violated the June
19th and July 25th Orders in that he has continued to communicate with
the Defendants and/or their supervisory employees both personally and
through e-mail . See (DE#766
, pg 3, ¶6), (DE#791).
Judge Graham: I can make you stop
prosecuting your lawsuits based merely upon my speculation about your
motives. I don't give a damn about the quality of your
lawsuit! (DE#878,
dtd. September 20, 2001)
Graham has concluded that Mason was involved in “vexatious
and relentless litigation” based upon unauthenticated email. 99-14027, (Doc.
878, pgs. 4-6). “Under
Fed.R.Evid. 901(a), documents must be properly authenticated as a
condition precedent to their admissibility ‘by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims.’" U.S.
v.. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2000). Mason
has consistently denied authoring these emails, in fact, Mason has
specifically informed the Court that the Defendants and their counsel
were fabricating email and attributing them to this Petitioner.
99-14027, (DE #167)[1]. However,
the Court declined to do anything about it. The Court used its
“inherent” or “mystical” powers and authenticated them anyway.
99-14027, (DE #174). The District Court, or Donald L. Graham,
supports his decision with quotations from unauthenticated and
fabricated email like:
l)"Anybody who supports your position on this matter is a
racist and is part of the problem. I fear no man.!! This
includes white men wearing robes.";
2)"You don't have enough Insurance and smart lawyers to
outrun the law and defeat me.";
3)"I ain't going to have a handful of white bigots run over
me.";
4)"Now go call your daddy in Fort Pierce and see if he can
get you out of this mess.
5)".. the hell I
would give them, hell like you are getting ain't going to be
bully by no racist white man." (Case Number 99-14027, D.E.
#646).
Judge
Graham is even willing to
lie or at best, tell a half truth to justify this injunction,
for example, Judge Graham states:
Plaintiff
Marcellus M . Mason ( "Mason") has filed eleven (11) cases and/or
counterclaims in this District, all against either the Highlands
County Board of County Commissioners, the Highland Library Cooperative
and/or various board members or employees of the County and Library
.(collectively the "Defendants"). Each case relates to his prior
employment by Defendants and Defendants' treatment of Mason after his
termination . See (DE#878,
pg. 3)
The record clearly states that Mason
only "filed" four lawsuits. These four lawsuits were consolidated
into one lawsuit, Case No. 99-14027-CV-Graham. See litigation, or Litigation Summary.
Judge Graham refused to rule on the merits
of the case.
On June 20, 2001, when Judge Graham dismissed this case, both the
Plaintiff and the Defendants had summary judgment motion spending that
the district court failed to act on. (DE # 507); (DE # 667); (DE#
668); (DE # 706);(DE # 797);(DE # 769);(DE # 770);(DE #785).
Judge Graham and his
Magistrate had previously ruled that such an injunction was improper.
Highlands County specifically asked for the type injunction
that Judge Graham concocted on September 20.2001. However, on
February 13, 2001 and January 16, 2001, Judge Graham and Judge Graham's
own Magistrate stated: “While there
are other pending cases between these parties, there is nothing near
the extent of the litigation which this Court and the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals usually look to for justifying injunctive relief.”
See Case No. 0014240 (DE 27, pg. 3)(DE 33), URL: http://geocities.com/mcneilmason/secret/00-14240/de27.pdf,
http://geocities.com/mcneilmason/secret/00-14240/de33.pdf. In
the period between February 13, 2001 and September 20, 2001, I did not
file any lawsuit in the S.D. FL.
ATTORNEY'S FEES OF $200,000
Judge Graham: I can make you pay $200,000 in attorneys' fees to
heavily insured Government Defendants based solely upon my mere
speculation about your motives. I don't give a damn if you had a
meritorious lawsuit and refused to rule on pending summary judgment
motions. I don't give a damn if you were proceeding in forma pauperis in this matter
and you are unemployed. See (DE
#882).
Judge Graham and his Magistrate used a concocted order and injunction, (DE#878),
rendered on September 20, 2001. to justify awarding attorneys' fees to
the government defendants on a case that was closed on June 20,
2001. Specifically Graham and his Magistrate stated:
Judge Graham specifically found this
present case to be "vexatious and relentless litigation on the part of
Mason. " (DE
#882, pg. 2).
Judge
Graham's order of September 20, 2001, also makes a specific finding of
bad faith. (DE
#882, pg. 3).
"Sanction orders must not involve
amounts that are so large that they seem to fly in the face of common
sense, given the financial circumstances of the party being sanctioned.
What cannot be done must not be ordered to be done. And,
sanctions must never be hollow gestures; their bite must be real. For
the bite to be real, it has to be a sum that the person might actually
pay. A sanction which a party clearly cannot pay does not vindicate the
court's authority because it neither punishes nor deters. " Martin v. Automobili Lamborghini
Exclusive, Inc., 307 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2002).
In direct contravention and disrespect of the law, Judge Graham awarded
the Defendants a whopping $200,000
in attorneys' fees when he knew I was proceeding in forma pauperis ( awarded by
retired Judge Edward Davis before Graham took over the case) and he
knew I was unemployed, and further, that my bills were in
arrears. In fact Judge Graham's court stated: ""
The Plaintiff has filed numerous affidavits seeking in forma
pauperis status in
this and in the many other lawsuits that he has filed. The
District Court has denied his
request for in forma pauperis status in
respect to filing of his lawsuits." (DE
#882, pg. 6).
Based
upon the financial affidavits filed by the Plaintiff herein, this Court
finds it hard to believe that he could pay an award of $403,350.00 in attorney's fees.
(DE
#882, pg. 7).
Plaintiff does not appear to have the
financial ability to pay anything. Based upon all of the foregoing,
this Court is going to recommend to the District Court that the total
attorney's fees of $403,350 .00 be reduced to a total of $200,000.00. (DE
#882, pg. 8).
Clearly, Judge Graham and his Magistrate have exhibited extreme
arrogance and hubris.
Judge Graham made his own standard for awarding attorney's fees.
For example, Judge Graham's Court stated: “This takes the case
beyond the analysis of frivolity.” (DE#882,
pg. 4, para. 9). It is settled law that a Plaintiff may not be charge
attorneys' fees unless his claims are totally without merit. “[A] plaintiff shouldn't be assessed his
opponent's attorney's fees unless a court finds that his claim was
frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff
continued to litigate after it clearly became so. And, needless to say,
if a plaintiff is found to have brought or continued such a claim in
bad faith, there will be an even stronger basis for charging him with
the attorney's fees incurred by the defense.” Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,
434 U.S. 412, 422(1978). “However,
to give meaningful effect to the private civil rights enforcement
scheme in Title VII, fees may be awarded to a prevailing defendant in a
Title VII case only when an action is unreasonable, frivolous,
meritless, or vexatious.” Songer v. St. Helena Unified
School District, et al., 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 17555,*2-3 (9th
Cir. 2002); Saman v.
Robbins, 173 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 1999); Bass v. Southwestern Bell
Telephone Inc., 817 F.2d 44 (8th Cir. 1987); Carlile, III, v. Conoco, Inc.,
2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 26498,*9 (10th Cir. 2001); Riddle v. Egensperger, 2001 U.S.
App. LEXIS 20889,*6-7 ;266 F.3d 542; 2001 FED App. 0341P (6th
Cir. 2001).
The Defendants did not prevail on a single issue.
Secondly, attorneys' fees should have been denied because the Plaintiff
survived multiple Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. See (DE
#191);(DE #192); (DE #227); (DE #45); (DE #466). see Songer v. St. Helena Unified
School District, et al., 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 17555,*3-4 (9th
Cir. 2002)( “We have held that a
denial of a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment suggests
that a plaintiff's claim are not without merit.“). Moreover,
in Songer, as in the
instant case, the Court held that attorneys fees were not appropriate
because the district court partially denied the defendants' first two
motions to dismiss and motion for summary judgment, holding that
Songer's claims "sufficiently allege" a violation of her First
Amendment rights. Therefore, as in Jensen, it was not unreasonable for
Songer to rely on the district court's rulings to believe that she had
a cognizable claim.”
LEGAL STANDARD FOR
ISSUING A "PRE FILING INJUNCTION"
Judge
Graham's so-called “bad faith” fails the MANDATORY due process
requirement. In a bit of hubris, Judge Graham stated; “THIS CAUSE came before the Court sua sponte.”
(DE#878). In the entirety of the document there is no mention of
notice and opportunity to be heard prior to the issuance of this
order. Did Judge Graham exercise “inherent authority” to ignore
the “rule flaw”? At page 3 of this order Judge Graham claim Judge
Graham have inherent authority to issue the order in
question. “A court should be cautious in exerting its
inherent power and "must comply with the mandates of due process, both
in determining that the requisite bad faith exists and in assessing
fees.” Byrne v.
Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075 (11th Cir. 2001)(quoting US Supreme Court Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501
U.S. 32, 50 (1991)). “In addition, the accused must be given an
opportunity to respond, orally or in writing, to the invocation of such
sanctions and to justify his actions.” In Re Mroz, 65 F.3d
1567,1575 (11th Cir. 1995).
It is well-settled law that if a
litigant has a valid claim, then the litigant can not as a matter flaw
be guilty of bringing his action(s) in bad faith. “The only pertinent exception for present
purposes is the court's inherent authority to award fees when a party
litigates frivolously or in bad faith. (internal citations omitted) The
bad faith exception permits an award upon a showing that the claim is
‘entirely without color and has been asserted wantonly, for purposes of
harassment ordeal, or for other improper reasons.’ Neither
meritlessness alone, nor improper motives alone, will
suffice. ***Hostility between parties or their counsel ought not
to invalidate a lawsuit brought to obtain proper legal relief for
potentially meritorious claims.” Colombritov. Kelly, 764 F.2d 122 (2nd Cir. 1985).
"Courts will generally not inquire into the
motives which actuate the plaintiff in bringing his action, if he has a
legal right which he seeks to protect. It is no defense to a valid
cause of action that the motive or ulterior purpose of the plaintiff in
bringing the suit is based on animosity or malice. Where the
plaintiff shows aright to the relief sought, it is immaterial that he
is seeking it for purposes other than the ascertainment and enforcement
of the rights which here lies." 1 Fla.Jur. 2d, Actions,
Section 29, Page 289. See also CHI. R.I. & PAC. RY. v. Dowell,
229 U.S. 102, 114 (1913) (“If the plaintiff had a cause of action
which was joint and had elected to sue both tort-feasors in one action,
his motive in doing so is of no importance.”); Chi., Rock Island RY. v.
Whiteaker, 239 U.S. 421, 424-5 (1915) (“ the motive of plaintiff, taken by itself,
does not affect the right to remove" and that "if there is a joint
liability he has an absolute right to enforce it, whatever the reason
that makes him wish to assert the right.“); Glorsky v. Wexler, 142 N.J.
Eq. 55, 57 (1948) (“[a]n
improper motive cannot defeat the enforcement of a lawful right
“); Nika v. Danz, 199
Ill.App.3d 296(1990) (“Plaintiff
is correct that a party's bad motives in commencing an action are not a
valid defense to the action and are immaterial “); Williamson v. Osenton, 232
U.S. 619, 622-3(1914) (“[U]sually
the court will not inquire into the motives of a party in doing an act
such as making an assignment or changing his domicil, the court will
not hold that one is not a citizen of a State when, in fact, he is a
citizen, solely because his purpose in becoming such a citizen was to
enable him to bring a suit.”).
|
